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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

]

Plaintiff-Respondent, ]

Case No. 900267-CA

vs.
i
DAYTON J- ("Rocky") BELGARD,

Priority No. 2

'

Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
This is an appeal from a judgment and commitment after a
conviction for a third-degree felony.

Jurisdiction of this Court

is therefore conferred by 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953,
as amended.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
POINT I:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FAILING
TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE, TO WIT, A HAND
GUN WHICH WAS SEIZED IN VIOLATION OF
DEFENDANT'S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
TO
BE FREE
FROM UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES AND IN CONTROVENTION OF THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT AS
DELINEATED IN ARTICLE I, SECTION 14
OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The

determinative

constitutional

provisions

are

as

follows:
1.

Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah

provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
2. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall be issued, but upon
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

Appellant was convicted of the

crime of possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person,
a felony of the third degree, and sentenced to the Utah State
Prison for the indeterminate term of from 0 to 5 years.

The

proceedings occurred in the Third Judicial District in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno,
Judge presiding.
B. Course of Proceedings. Defendant-Appellant, Dayton J.
("Rocky") Belgard was charged with possession of a dangerous weapon
by a restricted person, a felony of the third degree.

After a

bench trial with the Honorable Raymond S. Uno presiding, wherein
the defendant was convicted as charged, the defendant-appellant
filed a Motion to Arrest Judgment and For Suppression of Evidence,
which raised a question regarding the constitutionality of certain
evidence that was seized from the defendant at his hotel room and
used against him at his trial.

The trial court scheduled an

evidentiary hearing on that issue and received testimony from
Officer Bruce Maxwell and others regarding the search and seizure
issue.
After briefing and argument, the Court denied defendant's
Motion for Arrest of Judgment and For Suppression of Evidence, and
from that Order defendant-appellant appealed.
C. Disposition at trial court. A judgment and commitment
in the case was entered by the Court on or about May 2, 1990,
judging the defendant guilty of the current charge and committing
him to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate term of from 05 years.
D.

Relevant facts.

On March 3, 1989, Officer Bruce

Maxwell, of the Salt Lake City Police Department, was dispatched
to 1530 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, in connection with
an auto theft investigation at Jensen Motors.
February

21, 1990, p. 4)

(Tr. hearing,

Officer Maxwell learned

from the

complainant that on March 2, 1989, in the evening hours, two people
had been in looking at a used car, and that those two people were
interested in trading a hand gun and a VCR for this automobile.
The two people involved were one male and one female.
3

(Tr.

hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 5) Officer Maxwell further learned
from the complainant that after the two individuals had left, the
keys to the automobile they had been looking at were missing. (Tr.
hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 7)
The complainant further told Officer Maxwell that at some
time during the evening hours of March 2 and the early morning
hours of March 3, that the car the two people had been looking at
was stolen.

The particular car was distinctive in that it had a

cracked windshield and distinctive stripes. (Tr. hearing, February
21, 1990, p. 7.)
Officer Maxwell learned that on the morning of March 3,
1990, the complainant had seen the vehicle pull into a motel
directly across the street from the dealership.

The car was

occupied at that time by a male and female. (Tr. hearing, February
21, 1990, p. 7)
Armed with that information, Officer Maxwell took the
complainant with him in his police car and drove to the motel where
the car had been spotted. At the motel, he observed that there was
only one entrance to the motel which was used as both an exit and
an entrance to the motel area; that each particular motel unit had
assigned to it a carport.

(Tr. hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 7)

Officer Maxwell and the complainant observed the automobile which
was stolen parked at the carport to Unit No. 4, and further
observed that Unit No. 4 was occupied. The complainant positively
identified that car as the stolen vehicle.
21, 1990, p. 8)
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(Tr. hearing, February

Officer Maxwell, keeping the entrance to Unit No. 4, as
well as the carport area, under constant surveillance, and further
observing that there was no back entrance or exit to Unit No. 4,
requested two other officers as backup.

When the other officers

arrived, Officer Maxwell sent one of the officers around to the
back to observe the back window of Unit No. 4, and he and the other
officer approached the front, or the door to Unit No. 4.

(Tr.

hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 9) Officer Maxwell knocked on the
door to Unit No. 4.

The defendant opened the door half way,

attired in his undershorts.

Officer Maxwell immediately stepped

in and observed a weapon on the bed and hand-cuffed defendantappellant.

(Tr. hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 15)

Officer Maxwell testified at the Suppression Hearing that
he was aware of and had in the past availed himself of the
procedures to obtain telephonic warrants, but in this case, elected
not to avail himself of those procedures before entering the motel
room.

(Tr. hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 19)

He further

testified that the time period from the time the motel room first
went under surveillance until the officers entered the motel room
was approximately 15 minutes, and that during that period of time,
the room and the car had been under constant surveillance by the
police officers.

(Tr. hearing, February 21, 1990, p. 20)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The

officer

was

obligated,

after

having

developed

sufficient probable cause to make an arrest, to secure either an
arrest warrant telephonically, or otherwise, before entering the
5

motel room to effect the arrest.

His failure to obtain any type

of arrest warrant violates the defendant's rights as delineated
under Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution, and the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and that
evidence should not have been used to convict the defendant of the
crime charged.
ARGUMENT
POINT I:

UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE
UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, AN
ARREST WARRANT IS REQUIRED BEFORE
ENTRY INTO A RESIDENCE TO EFFECT A
ROUTINE FELONY ARREST. FAILURE TO
ACQUIRE THAT WARRANT BEFORE ENTRY
REQUIRES THE SUPPRESSION OF THE
EVIDENCE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF THE
ILLEGAL ENTRY..

The United States Supreme Court, in Payton v. New York.
445

U.S.

573

(1980)

held

that

absent

consent

or

exigent

circumstances, an arrest warrant is required before a suspect can
be arrested in his home. The Supreme Court acknowledged in Payton
that a basic principle of Fourth Amendment law is that a warrant
is required before the entry of the home is made to effect an
arrest.
Lower courts have continued to address the ramifications
of the Payton decision, and have concluded that the meaning of
"home" which was left unanswered by the Supreme Court in Payton,
extends to motel rooms. The Indiana Court of Appeals in Mowrer v.
State, 447 N.E.2d 1129 (Ind.App. 1983) held that a prior warrant
should have been obtained before officers entered a hotel room to
arrest the defendant.

The defendant's use of his room to engage
6

in illegal narcotics transaction did not, in the Court's opinion,
diminish its status as its "home" for purposes of applying the
warrant requirement.

Similarly, guests who establish to the

Court's satisfaction that they were more than mere transients,
were held by the 11th Circuit in U.S. v. Torres, 705 F.2d 1287
(11th

Cir.

1983) to

be

covered

by

Payton's

prior

warrant

requirement.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also concluded in
U.S. v. Curaon. 700 F.2d 482 (10th Cir. 1983) that one of the
factors

to

be

considered

in

determining

whether

exigent

circumstances exist was the time required to obtain a telephonic
search warrant.

Recognizing that the requirement of the warrant

to enter a person's home is almost absolute, regardless of the
abundance
intrusion.

of

probable

cause

that may

otherwise

justify

the

As the Payton court stated:

It is a "basic principle of Fourth Amendment
law that searches and seizures inside a home
without a warrant are presumptively unreasonable."
In fact, this Court, in State v. Northrup. 756 P. 2d 1228
(Utah Ct.App. 1988) has recognized the viability and necessity of
the Payton rationale in connection with a warrantless search of an
individual's home based upon sufficient probable cause in holding:
First we examine whether the police officer's
entry into the home prior to the arrival of the
search warrant violated Northrup's rights under the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
"Physical entry of the home is the chief evil
against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed."
[citations omitted] The warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, which is
imposed on agents of the government who seek to
enter a home for purposes of search or arrest, is
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the "principal protection against unnecessary
intrusions into private dwellings."
Thus, the
United States Supreme Court has recognized as a
basic principle, that "searches and seizures inside
a home without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable." Payton v. U.S., 445 U.S. 573, 586
(1980).
It cannot be seriously contended that the officer lacked
probable cause to secure a warrant.

He had specifically located

a car which the owner identified as a stolen car. He had that car
under

constant

dispatched

surveillance

from

the

time

he

was

initially

to the motel until after the appellant's arrest.

Additionally, the car was specifically located in the carport
assigned to a specific motel room in the motel complex. There was
probable cause to believe that the male and female who drove the
automobile from the place in which it was stolen to the motel, were
the same two

individuals who had

automobile the day before.

attempted

to purchase the

The officer was obligated to attempt

to secure an arrest warrant and/or a search warrant for the motel
prior to entering the motel. No amount of probable cause dispenses
with the requirement under Payton to obtain a warrant before the
entry.
POINT II:

ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF THE UTAH
CONSTITUTION REQUIRES THAT A WARRANT
BE OBTAINED BEFORE ENTRY INTO A HOME
TO EFFECT AN ARREST.

The Utah Supreme Court, in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460
(Utah 1990) developed a State constitutional analysis of Article
I, Section 14 in holding as follows:
The time has come for this court in applying
an automobile exception to the warrant requirement
of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution,
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to try to simplify, if possible, the search and
seizure rules so that they can be more fairly
followed by the police and the courts, and, at the
same time, provide the public with consistent and
predictable
protection
against
unreasonable
searches and seizures. This can be accomplished
by eliminating some of the confusing exceptions to
the warrant requirements that have been developed
by federal law in recent years.
See id.
Specifically, this court will continue to use the
concept of expectation of privacy as a suitable
threshold criterion for determining whether Article
I, Section 14 is applicable. Then if Article I.
Section 14 appliesP warrantless searches will be
permitted only where they satisfy their traditional
justification, namely, to protect the safety of
police or the public or to prevent the destruction
of evidence. . . .
Historically, this court, in applying Article
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution to
warrantless vehicle searches, has required both
probable
cause
and
exigent
circumstances.
[Emphasis Added]
The Larocco Opinion, albeit concerning itself with searches
of automobiles, has general application to the state constitutional
analysis of Article I, Section 14.

In Larocco. the Utah Supreme

Court, in determining under which general theory Article I, Section
14 should be interpreted, that of general reasonableness or the
warrant

requirement, came

requirement.

down

on

the

side

of

the warrant

Constitutional analysis in the federal system has

generally taken a confusing path. Larocco is significant in terms
of Utah constitutional law. The Utah Supreme Court determined that
warrantless searches will be permitted only where they satisfy
their traditional justification, namely, to protect the safety of
police or the public, or to prevent the destruction of evidence.
In the case at bar, under the Larocco analysis, the State
bears the burden of establishing either the existence of exigent

circumstances, namely the destruction of evidence, or the need to
act to protect either the public or the police in order to dispense
with the warrant requirement of Article I, Section 14.
In this case, the State could not prove that either of
those exceptions were applicable.

It could not be seriously

contended that the evidence which the police sought would be
destroyed since they had it in constant view.

It could likewise

not be seriously contended that the safety of police or public was
involved, since the motel

room

had been

under total police

surveillance since their arrival and there was no back entrance.
There was no indication that the occupants of the motel were in any
way endangering anyone. The telephonic warrant requirements under
77-23-4(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, do not require
the existence of any exigent circumstances or safety concerns for
the authorization of a telephonic warrant. See State v. Lopez, 676
P.2d 393, 396 (Utah 1984).
The conclusion is inescapable that under Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution and the Larocco analysis, the entry
into Mr. Belgard's motel room was unconstitutional and the evidence
obtained as the result of that unconstitutional entry should be
suppressed.
CONCLUSION
Because the entry into Mr. Belgard's motel room violated
both the Federal constitutional provisions of the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution, the

10

evidence used to convict him should have been suppressed, and the
appellant seeks of this Court a reversal of his conviction,
DATED this

day of September, 1990.
BROWN & COX
By:
KENNETH R. BROWN
Attorneys for Defendant
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I hereby certify that on the

day of September, 1990,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant was
mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
R. Paul Van Dam
Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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